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Inhalational Anthrax Due to Bioterrorism:
Would Current Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention Guidelines Have Identified
the 11 Patients with Inhalational Anthrax
from October through November 2001?
Thom A. Mayer,1 Allan Morrison,1 Susan Bersoff-Matcha,3 Glenn Druckenbrod,1 Cecele Murphy,1 John Howell,1 Dan Hanfling,1
Robert Cates,1 Denis Pauze,1 and James Earls2
1Department of Emergency Medicine, Inova Fairfax Hospital, 2Department of Radiology, Inova Fairfax Hospital, Division of Infectious Diseases, Inova Fairfax Hospital,
Falls Church, Virginia, and 3Mid-Atlantic Permanente Medical Group, Kaiser Permanente
A panel of 10 physicians used the nominal group technique to assess the ability of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) interim guidelines for clinical evaluation of persons with possible inhalational anthrax (IA) to retrospectively
identify the 11 patients with IA seen during the October 2001 bioterrorism outbreak. The guidelines would not have identified
10 of 11 of these patients, primarily because the guidelines were designed to address only those patients with a known history
of exposure or clearly identified environmental or occupational risk. The panel suggested revisions to the guidelines, primarily
consisting of broadening the criteria for evaluation to include either known exposure or environmental occupational risk,
or to include clinical symptoms consistent with IA. These extensions of the guidelines retrospectively identified 8 of 11 of
the patients with IA from October 2001.
During October and November 2001, 11 patients with bio-
terrorism-related inhalational anthrax (IA) were identified and
treated in the United States. The clinical course of these patients
has been described in previous publications [1–8]. After eval-
uation of the first 10 of these cases, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, GA) issued interim
guidelines for clinical evaluation of persons with possible IA
[9], which have not been updated. These guidelines focused
on “the evaluation of persons with a history of exposure to
Bacillus anthracis spores or who have an occupational/envi-
ronmental risk for anthrax exposure” [10, p. 984]. In an effort
to address these issues, we convened a panel of physicians who
used the nominal group methodology [11] to compare the CDC
guidelines with the epidemiological, clinical, laboratory, and
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radiologic findings of the 11 patients with bioterrorism-related
IA during their first visit to a physician. In addition to deter-
mining the ability of the guidelines to identify such patients,
the panel was asked to consider modifications to these guide-
lines that might improve the ability to identify and treat patients
with possible IA.
Experience with this outbreak raises questions in 3 key areas:
(1) public health recommendations and guidelines for evalu-
ation and treatment of patients with possible IA, (2) application
of clinical insight and judgment by the treating physician faced
with patients who may or may not have the disease, and (3)
communication between treating physicians and public health
agencies regarding the evolving clinical manifestations of the
outbreak.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
By use of the nominal group technique, an expert panel of
physicians (6 emergency physicians, 2 infectious diseases spe-
cialists, 2 epidemiologists, 1 internist, and 1 radiologist) who
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were involved in the evaluation and treatment of patients with
IA in the fall of 2001 was convened to compare current CDC
guidelines for clinical evaluation of persons with possible an-
thrax exposure (figure 1) to the epidemiological, clinical, lab-
oratory, and radiologic findings of the 11 patients with IA who
were affected by this outbreak. Because the study was designed
to assess the ability of the CDC interim guidelines to identify
patients for diagnostic evaluation and treatment, presenting
signs, symptoms, and epidemiological data from the patients’
first presentation to a health care provider were assessed. Clin-
ical symptoms or signs were considered to be present if they
were identified at any stage during the initial clinical visit, with
the exception of tachycardia. Tachycardia (heart rate, 100
beats/min) was considered to be present only if it was persistent
during the initial visit (after correction of fluid deficits), as
confirmed by 2 electronic determinations.
The interim CDC guidelines do not explicitly define occu-
pational exposure. For the purposes of this study, occupational
exposure was considered to be present if, at the time of the
initial clinical encounter, the patient was known to work in a
facility exposed to B. anthracis. For example, occupation as a
postal worker was not considered occupational exposure per
se. However, postal workers at the Brentwood Post Office in
the District of Columbia were considered to have occupational
exposure after confirmation of the index case from that facility
by clinical means on 19 October 2001 and PCR testing at the
CDC on 21 October 2001.
Eighty percent agreement among the review panelists was
required both to determine whether each patient either would
or would not have been identified by the CDC guidelines and
in suggesting revisions to the CDC guidelines. The modified
guidelines were then reassessed with regard to retrospectively
identifying and treating these patients, on the basis of their
initial clinical presentation and epidemiological data. Nominal
data were analyzed by Fisher’s exact test. a Was set at 0.05.
Descriptive statistics and ORs were also calculated. Data were
analyzed by SPSS, version 4.0 (SPSS).
RESULTS
Epidemiological data. The timeline of events for the Brent-
wood (Washington, D.C.) postal workers is provided in figure
2. Patient 3 was the first identified patient from Brentwood
with IA, the diagnosis of which was made on a clinical basis
on 19 October 2001. On 20 October, patient 4, who was also
a Brentwood postal worker, presented to the same emergency
department as patient 3, where a clinical diagnosis of IA was
also made. An internal communication network within the
emergency department and the hospital had alerted staff of the
clinical diagnosis of IA in patient 3. In addition, on the morning
of 21 October 2001, a telephone conference was held with area
emergency departments to inform them of the clinical findings,
laboratory study results, and chest radiograph and CT findings
for patients 3 and 4. B. anthracis infection was confirmed in
patient 3 by PCR testing at the CDC on 21 October, after which
a press conference with national news coverage was held to
announce confirmation of the diagnosis. Patients 5 and 6 pre-
sented to different emergency departments at 6:00 a.m. and
2:00 a.m., respectively, on 21 October 2001—before laboratory
confirmation by PCR testing for patients 3 and 4. Thus, only
1 patient (patient 4) was known at the time of initial clinical
presentation to have had a documented history of occupational
risk and therefore had been identified by CDC interim guide-
lines on the basis of such risk.
Clinical signs and symptoms. Table 1 summarizes the clin-
ical symptoms observed in these patients at the time of their
initial health care presentation. Each of the following symptoms
occurred in more than one-half of the patients: fever (11 of 11
patients), fatigue (10 of 11 patients), cough (8 of 11 patients),
myalgias (8 of 11 patients), nausea or vomiting (7 of 11 pa-
tients), dyspnea (6 of 11 patients), sweats (usually drenching
in nature; 6 of 11 patients), and ill-defined chest pain or dis-
comfort (6 of 11 patients). The mean number of symptoms
was 7.0. Among patients who lived, the mean number of symp-
toms was 8.5, compared with 5.5 in those who died. The mean
number of days from onset of symptoms to receipt of treatment
with antibiotics known to have activity against B. anthracis was
5.1 days. Among patients who lived, the interval from symptom
onset to receipt of treatment was 4.7 days, compared with 5.8
days for those who died.
Seven of 11 patients had fever (temperature, 137.8C), but
the mean presenting temperature was 38.0C. Only 3 patients
had presenting temperatures of 138.5C; all of these patients
died. All but 1 patient had persistent tachycardia (heart rate,
1100 beats/min), with a mean resting heart rate of 116 beats/
min (range, 79–152 beats/min). The mean recorded respiratory
rate was 19 breaths/min; however, only 5 patients had respi-
ratory rates of 20 breaths/min, and 3 of 5 patients who died
had initial recorded respiratory rates of 14 breaths/min.
Outcome. Six (55%) of 11 patients survived. Among pa-
tients who presented before they had clinical findings suggest-
ive of the advanced stage of the disease (fever [temperature,
138.5C], findings of meningitis, profound respiratory distress,
and hypotension), 5 (71%) of 7 patients survived. In contrast,
all 4 patients who presented in the advanced stage of the disease
died.
Comparison of interim CDC guidelines and revised guide-
lines for patients with IA. Although 80% consensus was
required in this nominal group technique, in fact, there was
100% agreement of the panel in both the evaluation of the
CDC interim guidelines as well as the revised guidelines. Of
the 11 patients with IA, only 1 (patient 4, a Brentwood postal
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Figure 1. Clinical evaluation of persons with possible inhalational anthrax. aFrom [12]. bFrom [13]. cAvailable through the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) or LRN; cell block obtained by centrifugation of pleural fluid. dSerologic testing available at the CDC may be an additional
diagnostic technique.
worker) would have been identified for screening and treatment
under current CDC guidelines (table 2 and figure 1). This
patient would have been identified by the CDC guidelines on
the basis of occupational risk because he was a Brentwood
postal worker who presented to the same emergency depart-
ment as patient 3 a single day after the Brentwood postal facility
had been identified as an occupational risk location. Patients
5 and 6 were also Brentwood postal workers, but both presented
before confirmation by PCR testing of IA in patients 3 and 4.
In addition, both patients 5 and 6 initially presented before
widespread media coverage of such confirmation and wide-
spread identification of the Brentwood postal facility as an at-
risk location. Thus, the lack of known history of exposure or
occupational/environmental risk was the reason that 10 of 11
patients were not identified by the CDC interim guidelines,
despite the fact that 8 of these 10 patients presented with clinical
findings consistent with IA (5 symptoms plus fever and
tachycardia).
In evaluating the epidemiological, clinical, laboratory, and
radiologic data on these 11 patients by using the suggested
revisions to current interim CDC guidelines (history of ex-
posure or occupational/environmental risk or5 symptoms of
IA plus the presence of fever or persistent tachycardia [heart
rate, 100 beats/min]), 8 of 11 patients were identified, in-
dicating substantially improved prediction rates (OR, 26.7; 95%
CI, 2.3–308.2; ).P ! .01
DISCUSSION
This retrospective study of 11 patients with bioterrorism-related
IA indicates that only 1 of 11 patients would have been eval-
uated and treated under interim CDC guidelines. The CDC
interim guidelines (figure 1) recommend evaluation for patients
with “history of exposure, or occupational/environmental risk
with two to five day illness” (emphasis added) [9, p. 946] in-
volving 8 symptoms and 1 clinical sign (fever). Perhaps because
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Figure 2. Timeline of events involving Brentwood postal workers with inhalational anthrax (IA). Reproduced from [9]. B. anthracis, Bacillus anthracis; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
ED, emergency department.
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Table 1. Summary of symptoms in 11 patients with inhalational anthrax.
Symptom
Patient
No. of
patients
with
symptom1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Fever/chills + + + + + + + + + + + 11
Fatigue + + + +  + + + + + + 10
Cough  + + +   + + + + + 8
Dyspnea  + + +    + + +  6
Nausea/vomiting +  + +  + + + +   7
Myalgias    + + + + + + + + 8
Sweats + + + +  + +     6
Chest discomfort   + +   + + + +  6
Headache   + +   + + +   5
Abdominal pain  +    + +     3
Confusion +        +   2
Sore throat   + +        2
Rhinorrhea  +          1
Syncope      +      1
No. of symptoms 5 7 9 10 2 7 9 8 9 6 4 —a
Outcome D L L L D D L L L D D —
NOTE. D, died; L, lived; +, present; , absent.
a Mean no. of symptoms, 7.0.
the guidelines were directed specifically at patients with known
exposure or identified occupational/environmental risks, they
require both epidemiological risk factors and a clinical presen-
tation consistent with IA, a requirement that is the primary
reason for the inability of the current guidelines to clearly iden-
tify patients in this outbreak for screening and treatment. A
second reason is the failure to include persistent tachycardia
as a clinical sign of the disease. The third reason is the guide-
lines’ recommendation that clinical signs and/or epidemiolog-
ical confirmation of exposure be present before antimicrobial
treatment is administered to such patients. Each aspect deserves
careful consideration.
Reliance on epidemiological plus clinical factors. The cur-
rent CDC guidelines require a known “history of exposure or
occupational/environmental risk with a two to five day illness”
consistent with IA [9, p. 946]. This approach might be effective
in a bioterrorism incident in which the at-risk population is
more clearly identified. In contexts in which the risk factors
for exposure are less certain, the CDC guidelines appear to be
less useful. All 10 patients whom the CDC guidelines failed to
identify for screening and treatment lacked a clearly known
exposure or known occupational/environmental risk at the time
of their initial clinical presentation. Clearly, the epidemiological
factors suggesting an exposure to a bioterrorism agent evolve
over the course of an investigation. In the Washington, D.C.,
anthrax bioterrorism attack of 2001, for example, at the time
that the initial clinical diagnoses of IA were made for patients
3 and 4 (19 and 20 October 2001, respectively), epidemiological
investigations to that point had limited the area of known
exposure to people who had been on the fifth and sixth floors
of the southeast wing of the Hart Senate Office Building on 15
October 2001 from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. [14].
Only after the clinical diagnosis of IA was made in patient
3 on 19 October 2001 was it known that the Brentwood Postal
Facility constituted an additional at-risk location and that oth-
ers outside the Senate Office Building had been exposed. Patient
4 (a second Brentwood postal worker who presented on 20
October 2001) would have been identified by the current CDC
guidelines. It is important to note that patients 3 and 4 pre-
sented to the same health care facility, where a clinical diagnosis
of IA was made and treatment was instituted. Although con-
firmation of B. anthracis infection by PCR testing occurred on
21 October 2001, an internal communication network estab-
lished within the hospital and its emergency department had
communicated the clinical diagnosis and laboratory and im-
aging findings of IA in patient 3 (figure 2). Two additional
Brentwood workers (patients 5 and 6) first presented at other
health care facilities on 21 October 2001 but before the an-
nouncement that IA had been confirmed by PCR testing, be-
cause widespread media coverage of the confirmation of IA
came via television and print coverage on the afternoon of 21
October 2001 and the morning of 22 October 2001, respectively
[15, 16].
Several days later, an additional postal worker whose work-
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Table 2. Identification of patients with bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax by interim Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) guidelines and by revised guidelines.
Patient
Date of
first health
care visit
Identified by
current CDC
guidelinesa Reason
Identified by
revised
guidelines Outcome
1 2 Oct 2001 No No known exposure or known risk; Bacillus anthracis
discovered by CSF culture
Yes Died
2 1 Oct 2001 No No known exposure or known risk; B. anthracis iden-
tified on nasal swab and pleural fluid culture and by
bronchial biopsy
Yes Lived
3 19 Oct 2001 No No known exposure or occupational risk; first identi-
fied Brentwood postal worker
Yes Lived
4 20 Oct 2001 Yes Second Brentwood postal worker; occupational risk Yes Lived
5 17 Oct 2001 No Brentwood postal worker; not treated with antibiotics
at initial visit
No Died
6 21 Oct 2001 No Brentwood postal worker; not treated with antibiotics
at initial visit
Yes Died
7 24 Oct 2001 No US State Department mail facility; receiving mail from
Brentwood; treated with ciprofloxacin at first visit
Yes Lived
8 19 Oct 2001 No Second Hamilton, NJ, postal worker; treated with
levofloxacin at first visit
Yes Lived
9 16 Oct 2001 No First Hamilton, NJ, postal worker; treated with levo-
floxacin at first visit
Yes Lived
10 28 Oct 2001 No No known exposure; hospital supply room worker No Died
11 16 Nov 2001 No 94-Year-old patient in Connecticut; possible cross-
contamination of mail
No Died
a From [9].
place received mail from Brentwood became ill and was later
confirmed to have IA (patient 7). On 17 October 2001, a Brent-
wood postal worker (patient 5) presented to his primary care
physician with symptoms of fever and myalgias, a temperature
of 38.9C, and a pulse rate of 79 beats/min. This case would
not have been identified at the initial clinical visit either by
epidemiological factors (because Brentwood was not known to
have been exposed to B. anthracis on 17 October 2001) or by
clinical findings, and, therefore, it would not have been iden-
tified by either the CDC interim guidelines or the proposed
revised guidelines we have suggested.
Therefore, the absence of specific, confirmed epidemiological
evidence of exposure should not, in and of itself, exclude con-
sideration of IA if, in the context of a possible bioterrorist
attack, the clinical presentation, laboratory findings, and ra-
diographic studies raise significant clinical suspicion of the dis-
ease. Indeed, these data indicate that patients with 5 clinical
symptoms of IA and signs of fever and persistent tachycardia
should be evaluated and treated if there is reasonable suspicion
on the part of the clinician that there is or may have been
exposure to an agent of bioterrorism, rather than waiting for
definite confirmation of epidemiological risk.
Tachycardia as a clinical sign. The only clinical sign in-
cluded in the current CDC guidelines is fever [9]. Seven of 11
patients had fever, but the mean presenting temperature was
only 38.0C, and all 3 patients who had temperatures of138.5C
died. The clinical presentation of patients in the first phase of
the disease more often included low-grade fever, as opposed
to higher temperatures in the patients who presented in the
advanced phase of the disease, all of whom died. Although
previous reports and commentary [2, 17, 18] have noted the
importance of tachycardia out of proportion to the clinical
symptoms in these patients, tachycardia is not currently listed
as a presenting sign in the CDC guidelines. All but one patient
in this series had persistent tachycardia, with a mean presenting
heart rate of 116 beats/min.
Reliance on clinical observation before confirmation of
exposure. The CDC interim guidelines indicate that patients
who do not have both a documented history of exposure or
occupational/environmental risk and a 2–5 day illness consis-
tent with IA should be “observed closely” and should be “pro-
vided antimicrobial prophylaxis if exposure is confirmed” [9,
p. 946]. Among survivors in this small case series of IA, the
mean interval from onset of symptoms to receipt of treatment
with antibiotics known to be effective against B. anthracis was
4.7 days. Among those who died, the mean interval between
onset of symptoms and receipt of appropriate antibiotic treat-
ment was 5.8 days. This suggests that the window of oppor-
tunity for treating IA in symptomatic patients is narrow—
perhaps as short as 24 h. Four patients who were not recognized
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to have IA upon first presentation to health care facilities were
subsequently determined to have the disease. Two patients (pa-
tients 5 and 6) were not treated with antibiotics and later died.
Both patients had presented to health care facilities in the sec-
ond, fulminant stage of the disease and were then treated with
antibiotics known to have activity against B. anthracis. Neither
of these patients would have been identified by current CDC
guidelines, and one (patient 5) would not have been identified
by the revised guidelines. The 2 patients who were originally
discharged from the hospital but survived (patients 7 and 8)
had been given ciprofloxacin or levofloxacin therapy and had
blood samples obtained for culture at the time of the first visit;
however, neither patient would have been identified by the CDC
guidelines for screening. Patient 7 was called back to the emer-
gency department 17 h after being first seen when culture of
a blood sample that had been obtained before antibiotic ad-
ministration grew B. anthracis. He had only taken a single dose
of ciprofloxacin. Patient 8 was provided oral levofloxacin upon
initial discharge and survived, although a definitive diagnosis
by blood culture and initiation of intravenously administered
antibiotic therapy did not occur until 2 days later.
Although this is a small case series, the fact that 2 patients
who received oral antibiotic therapy soon after onset of symp-
toms survived and 2 patients for whom antibiotic therapy was
relatively delayed died suggests that interruption of the pro-
gression of the disease by appropriate antibiotic therapy at an
early stage may be essential for successful treatment. All patients
who presented with the advanced stage of the disease died
despite receipt of aggressive therapy. Thus, this episode of bio-
terrorism-related IA suggests that a survival rate of 55% is
attainable only when early identification of such patients is
followed by aggressive and rapid treatment with antibiotics
known to have activity against B. anthracis.
Suggested revisions to IA guidelines. On the basis of this
review, the panel suggested revisions to the CDC interim guide-
lines (figure 3). Because of the inherent limitations in accurately
and rapidly ascertaining those at risk for exposure to B. an-
thracis spores within the setting of bioterrorism (as illustrated
by the outbreak of infection in Washington, D.C.), either ep-
idemiological factors or a clinical presentation consistent with
IA should provoke careful consideration of a clinical diagnosis
of B. anthracis infection by appropriate laboratory and radio-
logic investigation of the disease, consisting, at a minimum, of
blood cultures, chest radiography, and, when indicated, chest
CT. Gram staining of the buffy coat and analysis of pleural
effusions after thoracentesis may also be helpful. On the basis
of review of these patients, a clinical presentation consistent
with IA was defined by the panel as5 symptoms of the disease
(fever/chills, fatigue, cough, dyspnea, nausea/vomiting, sweats,
myalgias, chest discomfort, headache, abdominal pain, or con-
fusion) plus clinical signs of fever and persistent tachycardia
(heart rate, 100 beats/min). In such cases, clinicians should
consider whether the patient may have had a history of ex-
posure to B. anthracis, including occupational and/or environ-
mental risk. In addition to evaluating such patients, clinicians
should alert appropriate public health authorities to their clin-
ical suspicion of IA, so that appropriate epidemiological and
public health investigations can be pursued.
Our analysis indicates that patients with either epidemio-
logical exposure or clinical signs and symptoms of the disease
should receive treatment for IA with appropriate antibiotics
until blood culture results are negative and the patients’ sub-
sequent clinical course can be determined. However, we are not
suggesting that patients with this constellation of clinical signs
and symptoms be treated unless there is reasonable suspicion
on the part of the treating physician that bioterrorism or other
exposure to B. anthracis may have occurred.
One potential limitation of the proposed revised guidelines
is the difficulty in differentiating patients with IA from those
with influenza-like illnesses [10]. There is significant overlap
of symptoms between the 2 entities, and patients with IA typ-
ically did not appear to be acutely ill during the initial phase
of the disease. The seasonal and highly communicable nature
of influenza-like illnesses is well known but is of no particular
help in distinguishing individual patients. As noted by the
CDC, rapid assays for influenza lack sufficient sensitivity (range,
45%–90%) and specificity (range, 60%–95%) to be of clinical
usefulness in such settings [10].
The proposed guideline revisions would likely result in some
patients who do not have IA being evaluated and treated until
their blood culture results are known. How many patients
would be treated, what complications they might face (includ-
ing adverse reactions to antibiotics), and the potential cost of
such screening and treatment are currently unknown. We are
currently analyzing all patients presenting to the emergency
department of a hospital that was one of the primary Wash-
ington, D.C.–area treatment facilities during the fall 2001 attack
to determine how many patients would have been evaluated
and treated under the suggested guideline revisions.
On the basis of these findings, we recommend that patients
who have a clinical presentation consistent with IA presenting
in a setting of known or suspected bioterrorism exposure re-
ceive antibiotic therapy, pending the findings of blood cultures,
chest radiographs, and, when indicated, chest CTs. In all such
cases, the treating clinician should consider the possibility of
exposure to B. anthracis and obtain an appropriate occupa-
tional/environmental history. Close clinical follow-up for evi-
dence of progression of the disease should also be arranged,
and appropriate public health agencies should be informed
regarding any patients for whom a clinical diagnosis of IA has
been made or is suspected.
Clinicians faced with suspicion of IA in individual patients
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Figure 3. Revisions to the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention interim guidelines. AMS, altered mental status; CXR, chest radiograph; HR,
heart rate; IA, inhalational anthrax; LP, lumbar puncture; T, temperature. *Feature not previously known to be associated with IA. Adapted and expanded
from [9].
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during such bioterrorist attacks may need to apply different
thresholds for treatment than those recommended by public
health guidelines, because understanding of the epidemiological
risk factors associated with B. anthracis exposure necessarily
evolves over time. The 2001 attack demonstrated the impor-
tance of rapid communication between front-line practitioners
and public health agencies regarding this evolving understand-
ing of the clinical presentation, risk factors for exposure, and
appropriate treatment of IA. Improving communication sys-
tems between emergency department physicians, primary care
physicians, infectious diseases specialists, and public health
agencies should be a priority in future outbreaks of infection
[19]. Because bioterrorism now looms as a distinct reality in
our society, the intersection between public health guidelines
and the application of clinical judgment regarding treatment
decisions of potential victims of bioterrorism deserves contin-
ued consideration, study, and dedication of resources.
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